




FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND  
APPLIED ECONOMIC SCIENCES 
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES 
















B. De Borger (Department of Economics, University of 
Antwerp) 
I. Mayeres (Federal Planning Bureau, Brussels and 
K.U.Leuven – CES) 
 
 










Naamsestraat 69, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium) 
tel:  +32 (0) 16 32.66.33 
fax:  +32 (0) 16 32.69.10 
e-mail: Isabelle.Benoit@econ.kuleuven.ac.be 
Taxation of car ownership, car use and public 
transport: insights derived from a discrete 
choice numerical optimisation model   
Taxation of car ownership, car use and public transport: insights 




Bruno De Borger and Inge Mayeres (*) 
 





In this paper we study the taxation of car ownership, car use and public transport in the 
presence of externalities within the framework of a discrete/continuous choice model. We first 
derive optimal taxes in a simplified setting, emphasizing the specific role of fixed car 
ownership taxes and the relevance of public transport demand by non-car owners for the 
optimal tax structure. A numerical optimisation model is then constructed to study welfare-
optimal public transport fares and two-part tariffs on ownership and use of gasoline and diesel 
cars in Belgium. Results are as follows. First, we find that the current differences in tax 
treatment between diesel and gasoline car ownership and use cannot be justified on the basis 
of external cost and budgetary considerations. Efficient pricing requires substantial increases 
in the relative user tax on diesel cars as compared to gasoline cars; optimal fixed taxes are 
substantially below current levels and only marginally differ between car fuel types. Second, 
if for political or technical reasons variable car taxes cannot be optimally adjusted, large 
differences in fixed car taxes do result. The same holds if the government uses kilometre taxes 
as the main variable tax instrument. Third, the results of a series of marginal tax reform 
exercises suggest that a shift form gasoline towards diesel taxation is welfare improving, both 
for fixed and variable taxes. Somewhat surprisingly, a shift from fixed towards variable taxes 
is not necessarily welfare-improving: it is for diesel, but not for gasoline cars. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
  
  There now exists a substantial literature on optimal pricing and regulation of transport 
externalities, both in a first-best and in a second-best framework. Important early 
contributions include, among others, Vickrey (1969), Keeler and Small (1977), and Glaister 
and Lewis (1978). More recent research has extended this work, among others, to a general 
equilibrium framework (Mayeres and Proost (1997)), to account for endogenous departure 
times (Arnott et al. (1993)), and to incorporate optimal public transport supply (e.g., Viton 
(1983), De Borger and Wouters (1998)). Moreover, restrictions on the pricing instruments that 
have been studied include the impossibility to use time-differentiated taxes (Arnott et al. 
(1993), Verhoef et al. (1995) and De Borger et al. (1997)) and the impossibility to tax all links 
on simple transport networks (Van Dender (2001), Verhoef (2002)). Finally, the welfare 
effects of specific policy instruments have been evaluated using detailed numerical models 
(see, e.g., Kraus (1989), De Borger et al. (1997), Mayeres (2000), Parry and Small (2002)). 
  Interestingly, with very few exceptions (see below) the available studies ignore issues 
of car ownership and, as a consequence, they do not capture the inherent two-part tax 
structure that exists in most countries. Indeed, almost all governments separately tax car 
ownership (e.g., through annual vehicle taxes) and car use (e.g., through fuel taxes). In a sense 
the focus on various variable car tax instruments (fuel taxes, kilometre taxes, electronic road 
pricing, etc.) is not surprising, because under a wide range of circumstances variable taxes are 
more efficient at internalising external costs than, e.g., fixed annual vehicle taxes. However, 
there are at least three reasons why incorporating the ownership decision and the role of fixed 
car taxes may be important. First, fixed annual taxes on vehicles may play an important role 
in second-best situations when the government does not dispose of the variable tax 
instruments needed to adjust taxes to the relevant marginal external costs (see Chia et al. 
(2001), De Borger (2001)). Second, as suggested by, e.g., Rouwendal and Verhoef (2003), the 
two-part tax structure is quite relevant when governments face budgetary constraints. Third, 
the optimal tax treatment of different fuel types for cars, a discussion currently widely debated 
in a number of European countries, cannot be satisfactorily studied by exclusively focusing on 
car use, ignoring ownership issues (Mayeres and Proost (2001)). Ownership taxes affect both 
the composition of the car stock and the intensity of car use, and have therefore strong 
implications for the tax revenues on different fuel types.    2
  The purpose of this paper is to study the tax treatment of car ownership, car use and 
public transport demand within the framework of a discrete choice numerical optimization 
model. The theoretical structure of the model extends De Borger (2001) for the presence of 
public transport options, which turn out to play a relevant role in the optimal tax structure. 
Consumers are assumed to have the choice between two types of car
1; alternatively, they can 
decide not to own a car. Public transport is assumed to be available to both car owners and 
non-owners. Consumers decide jointly on car ownership and on the demand for kilometres by 
car and by public transport. All transport services are assumed to generate externalities. The 
government is assumed to be budget-constrained and to have five instruments: fixed 
ownership and variable user taxes on the two car types, and public transport fares. The 
theoretical results show that the availability of public transport for people that do not own cars 
tends to raise optimal variable taxes above marginal external cost. Moreover, public transport 
pricing strongly interacts with the fixed user taxes on cars when variable car user taxes for 
some reason cannot be optimally adjusted to external costs.  
  A more elaborate numerical version of the model is then implemented to analyze in 
detail the tax treatment of different car types and public transport use on the basis of Belgian 
data. Both optimal tax results and the effects of a number of specific tax reforms are reported. 
First, we study optimal taxation of cars and public transport under various alternative 
restrictions on the variable tax instruments. Appropriate implementation of such restrictions 
allows us to mimick optimal kilometre taxes, optimal fuel taxes, etc. Moreover, we consider 
the optimal policy mix within the set of currently used tax instruments, assuming the 
government wants to generate the observed amount of tax revenues. Finally, we look at the 
role of fixed car taxes and public transport fares when variable car taxes cannot be optimally 
implemented for technical or political reasons.  
  The optimal tax results include the following. We find that the current differences in 
tax treatment between diesel and gasoline cars and their use appear to be unjustified on the 
basis of external cost and budgetary considerations alone
2. Efficient pricing requires 
substantial increases in the relative user tax on diesel cars as compared to gasoline cars; 
optimal fixed taxes are substantially below current levels and only marginally differ between 
fuel types. Large differences in fixed car taxes do result if variable taxes cannot be optimally 
adjusted. Welfare comparisons of the various optima suggest that substantial welfare gains 
                                                 
1 We have gasoline versus diesel cars in mind in this paper, but cars incorporating ‘clean’ versus ‘dirty’ emission 
technologies would be an obvious alternative interpretation. 
2 Currently in Belgium the fuel tax on gasoline is substantially higher than on diesel, whereas the annual vehicle 
tax on diesel cars is much above that on cars using gasoline.  3
can be realised by an optimal differentiation of fixed car taxes although, not surprisingly, 
much larger gains can be realised by allowing time differentiated (peak versus off-peak) 
variable taxes.   
  Second, the numerical model is also used to simulate the marginal welfare effects of 
various revenue-neutral transport policy tax reform packages. It is found that a policy package 
that combines peak road pricing with revenue recycling by either raising public transport 
subsidies or reducing gasoline taxes has the highest marginal welfare effects. A shift from 
gasoline towards diesel taxation is welfare improving, both for fixed and variable taxes. 
Surprisingly, a shift from fixed towards variable taxes is not generally welfare-improving; it is 
for diesel, but not for gasoline. 
  At least four recent papers have studied issues related to those analysed in this paper. 
First, Chia et al. (2001) also study the relative merits of fixed and variable transport taxes, but 
they do so in a totally different framework. A treshold income level divides the population in 
two segments. People with lower incomes exclusively use bus services, higher-income people 
are car owners; all their transport is done by car. The latter assumption (car owners travelling 
exclusively by car), is quite unrealistic in a European context, where a large fraction of public 
transport users (especially for commuting trips) actually do own a car. Moreover, only one car 
type is considered so that the relation between ownership and fuel taxes for different car types 
cannot be studied. Finally, they do not study restrictions on tax instruments. Second, Mayeres 
and Proost (2001) numerically investigate the implications of a particular budgetary-neutral 
policy proposal, consisting of changing the relative ownership taxes on gasoline and diesel 
cars. However, the car ownership decision is modelled fairly ad hoc and not based on an 
explicit (discrete choice) optimisation framework; moreover, it is assumed that ownership 
implies some committed consumption of car kilometres
3. Finally, unlike in their study, we 
consider both optimal taxation and tax reform exercises, and look at a richer set of transport 
tax reforms. Third, Verhoef and Rouwendal (2003) explicitly incorporate car ownership 
decisions in a model of pricing and investment on simple road networks. However, their focus 
is on issues of network financing, not on the tax treatment of different car types and the 
interaction with public transport availability. Finally, Fullerton and West (2001) analyse to 
what extent taxes on gas, engine size and vintage are able to mimick an optimal tax on car 
                                                 
3 On the other hand, Mayeres and Proost (2001) is more general than our approach in other respects: it is based 
on a formal general equilibrium model and it allows, at least in principle, to distinguish cars for personal use, 
cars for business use, and trucks.  4
emissions. However, they do not consider budgetary constraints and do not explicitly focus on 
the issue of fixed versus variable user taxes
4.   
  This paper has a number of obvious limitations. First, despite the strong implied 
restrictions on substitution possibilities, we use the logit model of discrete choice throughout 
the paper. The main reason is analytical tractability (see De Borger (2001) for discussion). 
Second, the paper takes a clear partial equilibrium point of view: the existence of other 
distortive taxes (e.g., labour taxes) only enters via an exogenous shadow cost of funds; 
moreover, we ignore distributional concerns throughout. Third, we ignore some of the 
international complications associated with the currently used variable taxes: for example, by 
focusing on one country we ignore fuel tax competition between countries (see, e.g., De 
Borger et al. (2004), Evers et al. (2004)). 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical model 
and interpret the resulting optimal tax structure. Section 3 describes the numerical 
optimisation model used for the empirical application. The construction of the reference 
situation based on Belgian data is explained in Section 4. In Section 5 we report optimal tax 
results under various constraints on the pricing instruments. A number of well-defined tax 




2.    Optimal taxation of car ownership, car use and public transport 
services in a model of discrete choice: theoretical background 
 
  The purpose of this section is to briefly extend the discrete/continuous choice optimal 
tax model described in De Borger (2001) to explicitly incorporate the demand for public 
transport services. This extension is useful for understanding the interaction between private 
and public transport in the numerical model presented in the next section. We focus in the 





                                                 
4  However, their analysis is quite relevant because the suggested tax mix boils down to a combination of 
imperfect variable user taxes (gas) and fixed annual charges (engine size, age). Interestingly, they find that 71% 
of the welfare gain under the Pigovian tax can be realised with a combined tax on size, gas and vintage; 62% is 
obtainable from a gas tax alone. 
   5
2.1.  Structure of the model 
  
 
  We consider an economy with N identical individuals. Let there be two car types, 
diesel and gasoline cars. Consumers are assumed to have three options. They may choose 
between the two car types (i=g,d), or they may prefer not to own a car (i=o). In addition, both 
owners and non-owners are assumed to have access to public transport.  
  Indirect utility conditional on selecting alternative i ( i v ) is specified as 
  iii vVu = +  (1) 
where  i V  are ‘universal’ indirect utility functions common to all individuals. The  i u are 
individual-specific components that reflect idiosyncratic taste differences. The conditional   
indirect utility associated with owning a gasoline or diesel car is given by 
  








c i b i i = = + + = −  (2)
  
where fixed taxes on the two car types are denoted by Fi (i=g,d). The variable prices per 
kilometre are given by pg and pd. Public transport price is denoted  b p . Conditional demand 
for public transport by owners of a diesel or gasoline car is given by 
d
b x  and 
g
b x , respectively. 
Demands for car use are denoted similarly by 
g
c x  and 
d
c x  for owners of a gasoline and diesel 
car, respectively. The consumption of the numeraire composite commodity, given that one 
owns a car of type i, is z
i. The externality level E is treated by the individual as exogenously 
given. Finally, conditional utility of not owning a car is 
 (,,) ( 0 , 0 , ,,) . .
oo o o
ob b b b Vpy E M a x u xzE s t p x z y =+ =  (3) 
where 
o
b x is the conditional demand for public transport by non-car owners, and z
0 is their 
conditional demand for the numeraire. 
  Assuming that people choose the alternative that yields highest utility, i.e., 
 (,,) ig d o v M a x vvv =  (4) 
and that the  i u  are distributed Gumbel i.i.d., the associated probabilities of the three options 
are given by  
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µµ µ µ
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 (5)  6
where  µ  is a scale parameter of the joint distribution of the  i u  (see Anderson et al. (1993)). 
Note that the probabilities of the three alternatives depend on fixed and variable prices and on 
externality levels: 
  (,,, ,,, ) , , igdb gd p ppy FFE ig d o π =  (6) 
  The conditional demand for kilometres can be derived from the conditional indirect 
utilities by Roy’s identity. Demand for car and bus transport by owners of car owners are 












         i=g,d (7) 
Similarly, public transport demand by non-owners is given by  
 (, ,)
o
bb x py E  (8) 
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 (10) 
and, obviously,  1 og d π ππ =− − . 
  The government’s problem can now be formulated as choosing the variable prices 
,, g db p pp  and the fixed car taxes  , g d FF  so as to maximise the expected value of maximum 
utility (see Anderson et al. (1993)):  
 
(,, , ) (,, , ) (, , )
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subject to the budget restriction 
 
,
() ( ) ( )
ig d o
ii i ci b b g bd bo b
ig d
Np c x F p c x x x G ππ π π
=

   −+ +− ++ =    
 ∑  (12) 
where ci (i=g,d,b) stands for the marginal resource costs of car and bus kilometres. Note that 
the budget constraint is imposed on the transport sector as a whole and not specifically on the 
public transport sector. Moreover, G incorporates the fixed costs associated with public  7
transport supply. In other words, public transport costs are assumed to be linear with constant 
marginal costs. The Lagrange multiplier associated with the government budget constraint is 
denoted by λ. 
 
 
2.2.  Optimal pricing rules: all tax instruments available 
 
  The derivation of the optimal pricing rules follows the same methodology as in De 
Borger (2001). The extension is briefly summarised in Appendix 1 to the current paper. 
Assuming, to keep the expressions transparent, that the marginal utility of income is 
independent of the ownership choice and that income effects of the conditional demands are 
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where  m  is the marginal utility of income, and the notation  ˆ x refers to compensated 
demands. The  i θ  (i=g,d,b) are the full marginal external costs associated with an increase in 
demand for car kilometres by gasoline cars, diesel cars and public transport. Finally, the 
                                                 
5 These assumptions are needed to simplify the results and to facilitate the interpretation. In the numerical 
model, they obviously are not maintained.   8
Slutsky equation guarantees that 0 Z > . Both the marginal external costs  i θ  (i=g,d,b) and the 
term Z are defined and discussed in detail in Appendix 1. 
          Turning to the results, first consider the variable taxes on cars and public transport. If 
the model did not include transport options for non-car users ( 0
o
b x = ), then all variable taxes 
are equal to marginal external cost, and fixed taxes are just used to make up for whatever 
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The intuition is that, although the fixed taxes can be avoided by changing ownership type, 
conditional on the car type selected they act like a lump-sum instrument. Hence, at the margin 
they are more efficient at raising revenues, and there is no revenue-raising role for the 
variable taxes (see Chia et al. (2001)).  
  Interestingly, however, the availability of transport options for people that do not own 
a car implies deviations from marginal external cost pricing for all transport services. 
Assuming that car and bus use by car owners are substitutes and that the budget constraint is 
sufficiently stringent (so that the shadow price of the constraint exceeds the private marginal 
utility of income), it follows from (13)-(14)-(15) that all variable taxes actually exceed 
marginal external cost. It is the absence of a conditional lump-sum tax instrument for non-car 
owners that drives this result. It implies that public transport fares now do have a revenue-
raising role
6. Moreover, to the extent that variable car taxes contribute to induced extra tax 
revenues on public transport (i.e., with nonzero cross-price elasticities of conditional demands 
for public transport by car owners with respect to variable car prices), the same holds for both 
variable car taxes. 
  Fixed taxes are similarly affected by the availability of public transport. To see this 
most directly note that, by inserting (13)-(14)-(15) into the fixed tax rules (16)-(17), the latter 
can be written as: 




ii i i c b b b b b
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Not surprisingly, raising variable car taxes above marginal external cost allows fixed taxes to 
be reduced. Raising public transport fares allows fixed tax reductions as long as public 
transport use by car owners exceeds that by non-owners. If public transport use by car owners 
                                                 
6 Observe that public transport taxes above marginal external cost may still imply large subsidies because of the 
fixed cost incorporated in the budget constraint G.   9
is small, then raising public transport fares generates insufficient extra revenue on car owners, 
and the fixed fee is raised to increase the probability of non-ownership.  
  What determines the fixed tax difference between gasoline and diesel cars? Note that 
the difference can be written as:      
  () () ( ) ( )
dg g d
g d bbbb b ggg c ddd c FF pc xx pc x pc x θθ θ −= − − − − −− + −−   
It follows that, if all variable taxes equalled marginal external cost there would be no reason 
to have different fixed taxes at all. As seen before, however, the availability of public 
transport for non-car owners implies deviations from marginal cost pricing and, hence, 
unequal optimal fixed taxes. The optimal fixed tax for a given car type is inversely related to 
the variable tax revenues for this car type and to the conditional demand for public transport 
by its owners. The reason is simply that a large conditional demand for bus use implies that 
more public transport revenues are generated on owners of this car type. Suppose, for 
example, that gasoline generates more variable tax revenues (this depends on various 
elasticities, see (13)) and that conditional bus demand is higher for gasoline car owners than 
for diesel owners, then the optimal fixed tax on diesel exceeds the one on gasoline.   
   
2.3.   Restrictions on variable car taxes 
 
  As noted in the introduction, fixed taxes are likely to play a much more pronounced 
role in correcting external costs if the government faces (technical or political) restrictions on 
the variable tax instruments. If the variable tax instruments do not allow differentiation 
according to pollution (e.g., kilometre taxes) and safety (e.g., fuel taxes) characteristics, fixed 
taxes can be useful to internalise part of the relevant externalities. Moreover, even if it were 
technically possible, it may not be politically feasible to charge the optimal variable taxes. 
Fixed tax differences may then have a potentially important role to play.  
  In this subsection we therefore look at the role of fixed taxes and public transport 
prices when governments are unable to implement the appropriate variable car taxes. For 
simplicity, we limit the discussion to one case, viz. the case of optimal fixed taxes and public 
transport fares conditional on exogenous and sub-optimal variable car taxes
7. Adapting the 
                                                 
7 Note that many other types of restrictions could be considered, such as the inability to differentiate variable 
taxes between car types; this would be relevant if the government used a kilometre tax as its main variable 
instrument. In general, however, the derivation of the optimal tax structure under different sets of restrictions is 
quite complex and, unfortunately, does not lead to expressions that are easy to interpret. We therefore limit the 
theoretical discussion to one specific example and leave several other relevant alternatives to the numerical 
analysis in the next sections.    10
derivation reported in De Borger (2001, Appendix 2) for public transport availability, one 
easily shows the following optimal tax rules (where, for simplicity, we have again assumed 
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  Results are easily interpreted. The optimal public transport fare (see (18)) just reflects 
a standard and well known second best argument. If variable car taxes are insufficient to 
cover marginal external costs, optimal public transport fares decline to the extent that this 
reduces conditional demands for car kilometres. If car use were substantially under-priced, 
one can easily justify public transport fares largely below marginal external cost, even with a 
stringent budget constraint. 
  The fixed car taxes are quite complex. To develop some intuition suppose, for the sake 
of the argument, that gasoline car taxes reflect marginal external costs but that diesel car use 
is severely under-taxed. The fixed annual fee on diesel cars then also serves to compensate for 
the excessive externalities generated by diesel car use. As a consequence, one expects the 
fixed fee on diesel to rise. Expression (20) shows that this in indeed the case, unless public 
transport use by owners of this car type is very small. Indeed, in the extreme case that bus 
demand by diesel owners is negligible and bus demand by non car owners is large, the fixed  11
fee on diesel cars may in fact go down. The reason is to be found in the effects of too low 
diesel taxes on public transport fares. It follows from (18) that the low diesel taxes reduce 
optimal public transport fares. In the extreme case that bus use by diesel car owners is limited 
and bus demand by non car owners is very large, the revenue losses on owners of diesel cars 
due to reduced public transport fares are negligible and the revenue gains on public transport 
users rise strongly; as a consequence, in the extreme the fixed diesel tax may go down despite 
the under-pricing of diesel use. 
  To investigate the determinants of the difference in fixed annual taxes, note that this 












































Relative fixed taxes depend on the relative under-pricing of gasoline versus diesel as well as 
on the relative use of public transport by owners of diesel and gasoline cars. A few 
simplifying cases help to illustrate the result. First, if the conditional demand for public 
transport by owners of both car types were equal, the relative fixed fees only depend on the 
degree of under-pricing relative to marginal external cost. Given that diesel is generally 
believed to imply larger marginal external costs than gasoline on a per kilometre basis (see 
Mayeres and Van Dender, 2001), this may justify the fact that countries that for some reason 
strongly under-tax diesel fuel (e.g., Belgium; the Netherlands, France, Italy, etc.) impose 
substantially higher ownership taxes on diesel cars. Second, if relative public transport uses 
are not equal, some corrections are needed. Suppose for the sake of the argument that gasoline 
were taxed at marginal external cost but that diesel were taxed at a much lower rate, and that 
the conditional demand for bus use by owners of gasoline cars  exceeds that of diesel owners. 
Two opposing effects are at play then. On the one hand raising the fixed tax on diesel relative 
to gasoline is desirable (first term on the right hand side of (22)) under the stated assumptions, 
because it shifts the car stock towards more gasoline cars, which generates more public 
transport demand. On the other hand, however, raising the fixed tax on gasoline cars is  12
desirable to compensate for the revenue losses due to variable tax under-pricing (final term on 
the right hand side of (22)). 
  To conclude this section, note that previous theoretical results were derived under a 
number of simplifying assumptions, including the absence of income effects in conditional 
demands and the absence of peak versus off peak differentiation. Moreover, it is also obvious 
that optimal tax rules easily become relatively complex when restrictions on tax instruments 
are imposed. Therefore, rather than theoretically analysing various other types of restrictions, 
we proceed in the next section to the development of a slightly extended numerical version of 
the model that will allow a numerical illustration of optimal taxes under a wide variety of 
potential restrictions on tax instruments.  
 
 
3.   The numerical model 
 
 
  In this section we present the numerical model that is used to study the optimal tax 
treatment of car ownership, car use and public transport in Belgium. The numerical model 
closely follows the design of the theoretical structure presented before. However, to make the 
numerical analysis more realistic and allow a richer set of tax policies, the following 
extensions are incorporated. First, to impose more structure on the model we opt for a nested 
discrete choice structure, unlike in the theoretical analysis. Second, apart from distinguishing 
two types of car (diesel and gasoline cars), we also distinguish between peak and off-peak 
traffic. This is important in order to capture the congestion externality in a realistic way and to 
allow analysis of congestion-related pricing policies. Third, we marginally adjust the 
objective function for two reasons: (i) it allows us, apart from analysing optimal tax structures 
in the presence of a formal budget constraint, to also consider optimal taxes when tax 
revenues get an exogenous weight (relative to the monetary evaluation of consumer welfare) 
in the objective function; (ii) it allows us to accommodate the inclusion of the most important 
externalities typically associated with transport services: congestion, air pollution and 
accidents. 
  In the remainder of this section we describe the structure of the numerical model. We 
first discuss how the various discrete and continuous choices faced by the consumer are 
modelled. Next, we briefly describe the tax instruments that are included, the modelling 
approach for the three types of externalities and the specification of the objective function. 
  13
 3.1.   Consumer behaviour 
 
 There  are  N identical households. Each household chooses (i) whether to own a car or 
not, (ii) the fuel type of the car and (iii) the annual mileage travelled by car and public 
transport, with a distinction between peak and off-peak transport. To model the household’s 
choice options, we consider the decision structure presented in Figure 1. A first sub-model 
describes the decision to own a car or not. Conditional on car ownership, the choice of the 
fuel type (gasoline, diesel) of the car (sub-model 2) is determined jointly with overall annual 
travel demand (sub-model 3). Finally, conditional on the choice of car type, we consider the 
demand for kilometres by car and by public transport, and the allocation to peak and off-peak 
demand (sub-model 4). This latter process is modelled as a continuous choice. If the 
household is predicted not to own a car, annual travel demand by public transport is predicted 
(sub-model 5). Finally, allocation over the peak and off-peak period (sub-model 6) is again 
modelled as a continuous choice.  
 
 





















  We start a more detailed description with sub-model 2. The deterministic component 
of indirect utility, conditional on ownership of a car of type i (i=g,d), is specified as (based on 
De Jong, 1990): 










=− + − −  − 
c
i cc c c
ii i i i i i r e f cc
ii
VP Y K F  (23) 
where Pi
c is the generalised price of travel for households owning a car of type i and Y 
represents generalised income. Ki and Fi are the annual fixed resource cost and the annual 
fixed tax for a car of type i. Finally, αi
c, βi
c and δi
c are parameters. We express indirect utility 
in monetary terms by dividing by , ξ
c
ir e f, the reference marginal utility of income. Assuming the 
stochastic components of conditional indirect utility terms to be Gumbel i.i.d. we obtain the 
probability of choosing a car of type i: 










 ∑  (24) 
where µ0 is a scale parameter of the joint distribution of the stochastic terms. The aggregate 











  ∑  (25) 
  Simultaneous with the choice of car type in sub-model 2, conditional travel demand by 
car owners is determined in sub-model 3. Applying Roy’s identity to the conditional indirect 
utilities (23) yields the following conditional travel demand functions for households owning 
a car of type i: 
  () () exp
c
i cc c c
ii i i i i X PY KF
α
δβ =− − −  (26) 
 
  Households owning a car are assumed to have a choice between car and public 
transport use in the peak and off-peak period. In order to incorporate this choice, sub-model 4 
first specifies Pi
c and Xi
c as CES aggregates defined on peak and off-peak prices and 
quantities (see Keller, 1976). These are in turn specified as CES aggregates defined on car and 
public transport prices and quantities. The above implies that demand for passenger 
kilometres by mode j (j = car, public) in period t (t = peak, off-peak), conditional upon 
ownership of a car of type i can be written as: 
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i is the elasticity of substitution between peak and off-peak transport, for households 
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it j P is the generalised price of a passenger kilometre (pkm) travelled by 
mode j in period t if one owns a car of type i. The generalised price equals the sum of the 
resource costs, variable taxes and time costs per pkm. The time costs depend on total road 




1 1 1, 1,
,,
,
c c i i cc c









 ∑  (28) 
is the CES price index for travel if one owns a car of type i, and second 
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 ∑  (29) 
is the CES price index for travel in period t if one owns a car of type i. 
  Moving to the top of the decision structure (sub-model 1) we define the deterministic 








=− +  − 
nc nc nc nc nc nc
ref nc nc WP Y  (30) 
where, as before, utility is expressed in monetary units by dividing by the relevant reference 
marginal utility of incomeξ
nc
ref . Here P
nc is the generalised price of travel if one does not own 
a car and α
nc, β 
nc and δ 
nc are preference parameters. It is assumed that no fixed tax is levied 
on households that do not own a car.  Under the assumptions underlying the logit model, the 
probability of owning a car is given by: 
  ()( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 exp exp exp
cc n c c Wµ W µ Wµ ρ =+  (31) 
where µ1 again is a scale parameter.  
 Sub-model  5 models travel demand of households not owning a car. Applying Roy’s 
identity to the conditional indirect utility (30) yields the following conditional travel demand 
functions for households not owning a car: 
  ( ) exp
nc nc nc nc nc X PY
α δβ =−  (32)  16
Households not owning a car are assumed to travel by public transport only. In order to 
distinguish between peak and off-peak travel, sub-model 6 specifies P
nc and X
nc as CES 
aggregates defined on peak and off-peak prices and quantities.  
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3.2. Tax  revenues 
 
  The government can impose variable taxes on car and public transport and fixed taxes 
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t public c  are marginal production costs per pkm, assumed to be constant. 
 
3.3.   Externalities 
 
  Congestion is included in the model through the generalised transport prices. These 
include the time cost associated with travel. The generalised prices directly appear in the 
conditional indirect utility function and therefore in the ownership probability and conditional 
demand functions. 
  The other external cost components (air pollution and accident costs) are assumed to 
generate constant marginal external costs, and to enter the welfare function in a separable and 
additive way. We define E as the monetary valuation of the expected external costs other than 
congestion: 
  ,, ,, , ,
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with  ,,
c
it j e  the marginal external air pollution and accident costs per pkm for mode j in period t 
if one owns a car of type i. The  ,
nc




3.4. The objective function 
 
  As previously suggested, we consider both taxation exercises with an exogenously 
imposed weight on government revenues and exercises with a formal budget restriction. First, 
in the former case, the objective function is specified as follows: 
  SW NU T E ψ = +−  (36) 
It consists of three components: overall consumer utility, government tax revenues and 
external costs other than congestion. By varyingψ it allows us to exogenously incorporate, in 
a crude way, the efficiency costs of using the tax revenues raised on the transport market. 
External congestion costs are directly captured in the utility component via the generalised 
transport prices; external costs other than congestion are captures as part of the objective 
function. Second, in the case of a formal budget restriction we maximise SW NU E =−  





4.   The reference situation: Belgium 2000 
 
 
  To calibrate the numerical model information on prices, taxes, car ownership shares 
and traffic flows is combined with estimates of behavioural parameters (various elasticities of 
demand and of the ownership shares) to calibrate the remaining model parameters. This 
procedure produces a reference situation that reflects an initial equilibrium with which the 
outcomes of various policies will be compared. In this section we provide more information 
on the assumptions and data underlying the construction of the reference situation. We review 
the most important hypotheses, present some important behavioural parameters, and provide 




4.1.  Constructing the reference equilibrium: general assumptions 
 
  The reference equilibrium is constructed so as to represent, in a stylised way, the 
situation in Belgium in 2000. It was constructed under a number of implicit and explicit 
assumptions. First, all price, cost and demand data refer to average figures for urban and 
interregional traffic. Second, public transport is assumed to be an aggregate of rail, bus and 
tram transport. For simplicity, it is assumed that it does not generate congestion
8. Third, the 
variable resource cost of car traffic is assumed to equal the net of tax fuel costs. To obtain the 
variable unit price, the variable tax per kilometre, which consists of the fuel tax in the 
reference equilibrium, is added on to the variable user cost. The fixed annual car ownership 
costs consist of interest and depreciation (a constant average life expectancy of 7 years is 
assumed). Annual fixed taxes consist of the annual vehicle tax and the annuity associated with 
the value-added tax levied on the price of the car at purchase and the registration tax. The 
variable unit price of public transport is simply the public transport fare. 
  
4.2.   Behavioural assumptions 
 
  The model is calibrated so as to obtain plausible price and income elasticities. As few 
reliable econometric estimates on demand elasticities are available for the specific Belgian 
case, we used values that were well within the range of those reported in the literature (see 
among others, De Jong (1990), De Jong and Gunn (2001), Oum et al. (1992), Goodwin (1992) 
and Train (1986)). Note that in some cases the estimates reported in the literature could not be 
directly transposed onto our model structure. For example, many published price elasticities 
of demand give the price sensitivity of total demand, not of conditional demands and 
ownership probabilities separately. Moreover, in cases where we did find separate conditional 
demand and ownership elasticities (e.g., De Jong (1990)) they were estimated within a 
slightly different model structure than ours. Finally, note also that the decision structure as 
presented in Figure 1 implies some a priori restrictions on the demand elasticities. For 
example, some conditional cross-elasticities are restricted to be zero. Moreover, conditional 
on owning a car of a given fuel type, the income and fixed cost elasticity of the different 
conditional demands for kilometres for the different modes and periods is the same. These 
                                                 
8 Obviously, although this seems plausible for rail and tram, it is not generally correct for bus transport to the 
extent that not all bus transport uses reserved bus lanes. In view of the rising share of bus kilometres on reserved 
lanes in urban areas and given our focus on relative fixed and variable instruments, we keep the above 
assumption as a working hypothesis.     19
constraints are of course not necessarily realistic; they are the price one has to pay for the gain 
in transparency and structure imposed on the model. 
  The calibrated demand elasticities used for the numerical analysis are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 reports elasticities of conditional demand with respect to money 
prices, fixed costs and income. The own price elasticities are within the range reported in the 
literature; in absolute value, they largely exceed cross-price elasticities. Moreover, own price 
effects are larger in the off-peak than in the peak. Generally speaking, the elasticities of 
conditional transport demand by diesel and gasoline car owners are quite similar. Public 
transport use by car owners is more elastic than that of non-car owners. Finally, the sensitivity 
of conditional demands with respect to fixed cost changes is very small, elasticities ranging 
from -0.03 to -0.05.  
  Table 2 reports the calibrated elasticity of the car ownership probabilities with respect 
to the money prices of car transport and fixed annual car costs, respectively. It shows that, 
plausibly, an increase in car costs of a particular car type has limited effects on the overall 
stock, but mainly influences its composition. Note that the calibration also implies that diesel 
car ownership is more elastic than gasoline car ownership
9. The calibrated elasticities of car 
ownership with respect to the price of public transport are close to zero; they are not included 
in the table. 
 
                                                 
9 To get a better feel for this, we have performed some additional simulations with the model. For example, 
doubling the fixed gasoline car costs would increase the share of non-car owners from 19% in the reference 
equilibrium to approximately 21.2%. The composition of the car stock is affected much more strongly: the share 
of gasoline cars would fall from 59.4% to 7.7%. For diesel cars a doubling of the fixed costs would result in a 
diesel share of 1.1% in the car stock. Doubling the fixed costs of both diesel and gasoline cars would increase the 
share of non-car owners to 29%.  
  20
 
Table 1:  Calibrated elasticity of conditional demand w.r.t. money prices, fixed  
    car costs and income (reference equilibrium) 
 










































































































































































































































Table 2:   Calibrated elasticity of car ownership probabilities w.r.t. money car  
    prices and fixed car costs (reference equilibrium) 
 












































4.3.   Marginal external costs 
 
 
  The model considers three externalities caused by transport: congestion, air pollution 
and accidents. Congestion is introduced through generalised transport prices that depend on 
average speed. The latter is determined endogenously using a speed-flow relationship that 
determines average speed as a function of the number of passenger car units per hour for each 
period considered. For the speed flow relationship we use the functional form of O’Mahony 
and Kirwan (2001) and calibrate its parameters on the basis of information on Belgian speeds 
and flows. The time cost per kilometre is the value of time per hour multiplied by the inverse 
of speed in km per hour. The value of time per hour is based on the review of the literature 
presented by Nellthorp et al. (2001)
10. 
  The valuation of air pollution costs is based on De Nocker et al. (2001) who applied 
the methodology of the European ExternE project to Belgium. The costs include the effects on 
public health, agriculture and materials of eleven pollutants: CO2, CH4, N2O, CO, NOx, SO2, 
VOC, PM, benzene, benzo(a)pyreen and 1,3 butadiene. The marginal external air pollution 
costs are calculated for the average gasoline and diesel car in Belgium in 2000. Air pollution 
costs are higher for diesel than gasoline cars due to the higher emissions of PM by diesel cars. 
  External accident costs are based on Mayeres et al. (1996). Under the assumption of 
constant accident risks, the marginal external accident costs are given by the product of the 
accident risk and the pure economic accident costs (net output losses, medical costs, police 
costs etc.). Three accident types are considered: fatalities, serious injuries and light injuries.  
  Table 3 gives an overview of the marginal external costs in the reference equilibrium. 
Note that the figures related to congestion are the direct marginal external congestion costs; 
the feedback effects (see Section 2) have not been captured in these figures
11. In the peak 
period congestion is the dominant external cost. In the off-peak pollution is relatively 
                                                 
10 For car transport the value of time used was 8.57 euro/h in the peak and 7.97 euro/h in the off-peak. For public 
transport the value of time is 6.1 euro/h in the peak and 5.02 euro/h in the off-peak. 
11 In the theoretical model (equations (13) to (15)) the optimal taxes are compared with the full rather than the 
direct marginal external costs. For the air pollution and accident externalities, there is no difference between the 
two, since they are not characterised by feedback effects. In the case of congestion there is a difference. The full 
marginal external congestion cost takes into account that a change in congestion itself affects transport demand 
and hence congestion; it therefore also has an impact on tax revenue and on pollution and accident costs. 
Comparing the full and direct marginal external congestion costs (MECC) of, for example, gasoline cars in the 
reference equilibrium, we found that the difference is large in the peak period (full MECC= 27.9 euro per 100 
kilometre, direct MECC=47.3 euro per 100 kilometre) because the feedback parameter is quite large at the initial 
congestion levels. In the off-peak the difference is limited.  22
important, especially for diesel car use. Overall, diesel car use generates higher marginal 




Table 3:   The marginal external costs in the reference equilibrium 









































4.4.   The reference equilibrium 
 
 
  Table 4 summarises demand and price information in the reference equilibrium. The 
following observations stand out from these figures. First, as previously suggested, under 
current policies variable taxes are smaller for diesel than for gasoline cars, whereas the 
opposite holds for fixed taxes. Note that the ownership tax differences are not just due to tax 
differences per se, they also reflect differences in the characteristics of the average diesel and 
gasoline car (e.g., power, size, etc.). However, this only accounts for part of the observed 
difference: diesel cars with otherwise similar characteristics are subject to higher fixed taxes 
than gasoline cars. Second, in the peak period variable car taxes are substantially below 
marginal external costs. For example, gasoline car use is taxed at 0.08 euro per passenger 
kilometre in the peak period (Table 4), whereas the direct marginal external cost amounts to 
0.485 per passenger kilometre (see Table 3). Third, while variable taxes in Belgium are higher 
for gasoline than for diesel cars, the opposite holds for marginal external costs. Fourth, the 
current variable tax instruments do not allow a differentiation of variable taxes according to 
the time of travel, while the marginal external costs differ substantially between peak and off-
peak. Finally, public transport operating costs are heavily subsidised.  
  The current tax structure has obvious implications for the structure of the car stock and 
for car use, see again Table 4. The share of diesel cars in the total car stock is among the 
highest in Europe (Mayeres and Proost (2001)): in 2000 it amounted to approximately 40% 
and was still rising. Moreover, the relatively low user taxes induce diesel cars to be chosen  23
especially by high demand users. The average annual distance covered by a diesel car is more 
than 50% higher than for the typical gasoline car. Also note the relevance of taking into 
account non car owners, especially when incorporating public transport availability. Non-
ownership amounts to almost 20%; the share of non-owners in overall public transport 
demand is more than 40%.   
 
Table 4: The reference equilibrium 
 
 Reference  equilibrium 







Peak & off-peak 















Car stock (million cars)  4.68 
Conditional annual mileage (pkm/year/household) 
No car 
Gasoline car owner 
 































5.  Optimal taxation of car ownership, car use and public transport in 
Belgium: numerical results 
 
  In this section we turn to the optimal tax results obtained with the numerical model. 
We first present the various policies studied (subsection 5.1), and then discuss the detailed 




5.1. The scenarios analyzed  
 
  As suggested before, we consider a richer range of policies than in the theoretical 
sections. An overview of the scenarios analysed is presented in Table 5. Scenarios 2 and 3 
closely resemble the tax problems studied in theory in Section 2; the others serve to 
approximate various other policy options. To summarise, note that in Scenarios 1 and 2 it is 
assumed that all available taxes (fixed car taxes, variable car taxes and public transport prices 
in the different periods) can be determined optimally; Scenario 2 assumes a budgetary neutral 
operation, whereas Scenario 1 does not constrain government revenues but assigns an equal 
weight to consumer welfare and tax revenues. To get insight into the role fixed car taxes can 
play if for political or distributive reasons governments refrain from strongly adjusting 
variable car taxes, Scenario 3 looks at the case where variable car taxes are exogenously fixed 
at their current levels, and it determines public transport and fixed car taxes optimally. 
Scenario 4 asks what can be optimally done on the basis of currently used tax instruments: it 
allows using all instruments but assumes that variable taxes cannot be differentiated according 
to peak and off peak periods; this is currently the case in Belgium, where fuel taxes are the 
main variable tax instrument. Finally, Scenarios 5 and 6 approximate for policies that are 
based on time differentiated kilometre taxes as the main variable tax instrument. To test for 
the potential welfare improvements that are possible when variable taxes cannot be 
differentiated according to fuel type, these scenarios answer this question for the case of 
uniform (Scenario 5) and differentiated (Scenario 6) fixed car taxes. The differences between 
these two scenarios will provide information on the role of differentiated fixed taxes when 
variable taxes are not differentiated according to fuel type.  25
 
Table 5:   Scenario assumptions 
 
Tax instruments   
Variable car taxes  Variable taxes 
public transport 
Fixed car taxes  Additional 
constraints 
Scenario  1  Optimal Optimal Optimal  None 





Scenario 3  Reference level  Optimal  Optimal  None 
Scenario 4  Optimal – No 
difference between 
peak and off-peak 
Optimal – No 
difference between 
peak and off-peak 
Optimal None 
Scenario 5  Optimal – No 
difference between 
gasoline and diesel 
Optimal  Optimal – No 
difference between 
gasoline and diesel 
None 
Scenario 6  Optimal – No 
difference between 
gasoline and diesel 




5.2. Empirical results 
 
 
  The results of the six optimization scenarios in terms of optimal taxes, demand 
structure and welfare effects are summarised in Tables 6, 7 and 8, respectively. Note that the 
objective function was discussed in Section 3.4. To facilitate the interpretation, in the 
exercises based on an exogenously imposed weight of government tax revenues, it was 
assumed that ψ equals unity (see (36)).  
  Consider Scenario 1. First and most importantly, it follows that the current tax 
structure on diesel and gasoline car ownership and car use cannot be justified in terms of 
external costs and budgetary considerations. In the current tax structure, diesel taxes fall short 
of gasoline taxes (0.06 versus 0.08) but diesel cars are taxed much heavier than gasoline cars 
(986 euro versus 640 euro). On the contrary, the optimal variable taxes on diesel slightly 
exceed (by 0.01 euro) those on gasoline to reflect the higher pollution costs associated with 
the use of diesel. Moreover, the current differences in annual vehicle taxation are unwarranted 
as well: the optimal fixed taxes hardly differ between diesel and gasoline cars. They are  26
drastically lower than in the reference, amounting to some 400 euro. Second, consistent with 
earlier literature (Mayeres and Proost (1997), De Borger and Proost (2001)), the unrestricted 
optimal tax structure implies higher variable car taxes on both gasoline and diesel car use in 
the peak period to capture the high congestion externalities in that period. Peak period 
variable taxes are as high as 0.20 euro per kilometre. Third, public transport operating 
subsidies in the reference case are replaced by optimal taxes that slightly exceed the full 
marginal external costs; this is due to correct pricing of the competing car modes.    
  The optimal tax structure has obviously important effects on the composition of the 
car stock and the transport demand structure. Table 7 suggests that it implies an increase in 
the car stock by some 0.3% but, not surprisingly, the share of diesel cars in the stock declines 
substantially: the number of diesel cars goes down by some 8.2%. Car use in the peak period 
declines by 18.5%, while off-peak car use increases substantially, by some 21.5%. In the peak 
period this results in a substantial increase of average speed. In both periods, the share of 
diesel cars in the production of car kilometres declines. Public transport use falls in both 
periods. The decline is largest for the off-peak period. The higher public transport fares also 
reduce demand by people not owning a car (a decline by some 13.7%), a potentially 
undesirable effect from a distributive point of view. 
  Table 8 summarises the effects of the optimal tax structure on the different 
components of the objective function. First, the tax increase implies that the utility component 
U increases slightly, although both non-car owners and diesel car owners are worse off. 
Second, the utility gain is reinforced by the higher tax revenues and the reduction in pollution 
and accident risks. The extra tax revenues provide the main contribution to the increase in 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 8:   Welfare effects of optimal taxes 
 
Scenarios   REF 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Social welfare (10
6 euro/year)  Change w.r.t. reference 
 
N.U 
Change in tax revenue*ψ 













































Relative performance w.r.t. Scenario 1 



























Note: for a description of the scenarios, see Table 5 
 
 
  In Scenario 2 we consider the optimal tax structure for the case were the government 
aims at correctly pricing externalities, but where the operation is assumed to be budgetary 
neutral: revenues are fixed at their reference level. The results for this scenario, which is the 
numerical equivalent to the theoretical model of Section 2.2, provide information on optimal 
adjustments to the current tax structure without generating extra revenues; this is often 
considered desirable for purposes of acceptability. The results of Scenario 2 suggest keeping 
the variable car taxes at approximately the same level as in Scenario 1, but at the same time 
drastically reducing the fixed tax levels (see Table 6). Consistent with the theory, variable car 
taxes exceed marginal external costs, the difference being largest for diesel car users. The 
higher variable taxes allow the fixed taxes to be set at very low levels; for diesel cars a 
subsidy is optimal. Differences in fixed tax levels are driven by deviations in variable taxes 
from the marginal external costs and differences in conditional public transport demand (see 
Section 2.2). As diesel car use is taxed higher relative to marginal external cost, this is 
compensated by a somewhat higher fixed tax on gasoline cars. It amounts to some 140 euro 
per year, whereas for diesel car owners we actually observe a subsidy on ownership. Public 
transport subsidies are eliminated, which is consistent with the theory of Section 2.2.  
  The conclusion for Scenario 2 is clear: at current levels of tax revenues, the existing 
tax structure implies too much emphasis on fixed taxes and imposes incorrectly low variable 
car taxes in the peak period. In fact, given the low level of optimal fixed taxes in Scenario 2 
they can probably simply be abolished at a relatively small welfare cost. Off-peak car taxes 
are approximately correct. The currently existing subsidies to public transport are too high.    30
  The described optimal tax policy of Scenario 2 increases the car stock, and encourages 
some shift of diesel cars to gasoline cars in the stock. Total car transport increases by 4% and 
there is a shift from peak to off-peak transport. The demand for public transport falls slightly 
more than in Scenario 1. The welfare gain amounts to approximately 98.4% of that in 
Scenario 1. The lower level of taxation raises the utility component, but there is obviously no 
extra tax revenue. The external cost savings are larger than in Scenario 1 because there is a 
fall instead of a small increase in total transport demand.             
  Scenario 3 looks at the kind of instrument restriction considered in Section 2.3. In this 
scenario we simply assume that public opposition forces variable car taxes to remain at their 
reference levels, so that fixed car taxes and public transport fares are the main devices for 
correcting all externalities. As shown in Table 6, this induces large increases in fixed taxes. 
Moreover, given the substantial under-taxation of diesel use in the reference situation and the 
higher external costs associated with diesel use, the resulting fixed tax on diesel cars is more 
than twice as high as for gasoline cars, almost 1950 euro for diesel compared to 860 for 
gasoline cars. Public transport subsidies are maintained in the peak period, though they are 
smaller than in the reference case. In the off-peak, public transport subsidies are replaced by 
taxes, since they have no major role to play in correcting for congestion. The result of this 
pricing scheme is that the total car stock is reduced (Table 7), and there is a large shift from 
diesel to gasoline cars. Table 8 suggests that the policy analyzed in Scenario 3 implies that 
substantial welfare gains can be realised by optimally differentiating fixed car taxes. 
Unfortunately, of course, as fixed taxes are not suited very well to tackle congestion (yielding 
too much car traffic in the peak period and too little car traffic in the off-peak period), the 
figures in Table 8 suggest that Scenario 3 is much less efficient than Scenario 1: it only yields 
14% of the potential welfare gain. 
  The aim of Scenario 4 is to see what can be done with the set of tax instruments 
currently in use. To mimick the idea of combining fixed car taxes with the use of fuel taxes as 
the main variable tax instrument on car use, we assume all tax instruments are available, but 
variable taxes are restricted to be equal for peak and off-peak travel. Table 6 shows that the 
resulting optimal variable taxes are in between the full marginal external costs in the peak and 
the off-peak period. More importantly, because the variable car taxes in the peak are too low 
relative to the optimum, fixed car taxes are higher than in Scenario 1. They do not differ 
substantially between fuel types, being again somewhat higher for diesel cars; they amount to 
850-900 euros per year. This corresponds to an increase in the tax on gasoline cars with  31
respect to the reference; the tax on diesel cars slightly declines. Public transport is almost 
priced at marginal operating costs, very small subsidies remain.  
  Summarizing Scenario 4, optimising the currently used set of tax instruments would 
suggest reducing public transport subsidies, raising fuel taxes on car use (slightly for gasoline, 
more substantially for diesel), and approximately equalizing fixed car taxes at a level between 
the current levels for gasoline and diesel cars. 
  The higher fixed taxes in this scenario lead to a reduction in the car stock and there is 
a shift towards more gasoline cars and more gasoline car km. However, the uniform variable 
taxes lead to a reduction in both peak and off-peak car transport. They are therefore much less 
appropriate to address congestion. Compared to the optimum peak car transport is too high 
and off-peak car transport is too low. As a result only 18.2% of the maximum welfare gain 
can be obtained by restricting the variable taxes to be uniform across periods. 
  Scenario 5 and 6 finally imitate the use of optimal time-differentiated kilometre taxes 
by assuming that variable car taxes are restricted to be uniform across fuel types. In Scenario 
5 it is further assumed that fixed car taxes are uniform; this is not the case in Scenario 6. 
Results for Scenario 5 are as follows: fixed car taxes are drastically reduced compared to the 
reference situation. Due to the higher tax revenues on variable taxes, they are even lower than 
in Scenario 1. Since air pollution costs are only a minor component of the social welfare 
function and the kilometre taxes are time-differentiated, this scenario does not perform much 
worse than Scenario 1: it achieves 98.5% of the welfare gain.  
  When variable taxes are restricted to be uniform across fuel types, but fixed taxes are 
not – as in Scenario 6 – the full optimum can be approximated very closely by setting a fixed 
tax on diesel cars that is twice that on gasoline cars. Using this strategy one realises 99.5% of 
the maximum welfare gain. In other words, the use of time-differentiated kilometre taxes 
combined with fixed tax differentiation on car types comes very close to Scenario 1.  
  
5.3. Policy implications 
 
  It is instructive to summarise some implications of the optimal tax results. In view of 
the topic of the paper, we emphasise the findings with respect to optimal fixed taxes and the 
role of public transport. 
  
(i)  Assuming that the government has perfect tax instruments (Scenario 1), we 
found that optimal fixed car taxes fall from their current levels to about 400  32
euro per year; they do not differ notably between car types. Public transport 
subsidies would decline substantially; peak car taxes would rise to capture 
congestion costs.  
 
(ii)  If the government has all instruments but, for reasons of acceptability of its 
policies, restricts tax revenues to currently observed tax revenues (Scenario 2), 
then we found fixed car taxes to be very low (140 euro for gasoline cars, 
negative for diesel cars); in fact, in view of administrative costs of tax 
collection, it might in this case be optimal to eliminate fixed car taxes 
altogether. Variable car taxes would exceed the respective marginal external 
costs; public transport fares would exceed marginal operating costs.  
 
(iii)  If the government used the set of instruments it currently employs but chooses 
the tax levels optimally (Scenario 4), then it would raise the fixed car tax on 
diesel by some 200 euro, while slightly reducing it for gasoline cars. Public 
transport would be subsidised, although at lower rates than in the reference 
situation.  
 
(iv)  If the government is unwilling to adjust variable car taxes (Scenario 3), then 
very large increases in fixed taxes on diesel cars are required: the tax on diesel 
cars approximately doubles, that on gasoline cars rises by some 30%.  
 
(v)  Finally, despite limited welfare losses of kilometre taxes, the implications of 
kilometre taxes (Scenario 6) as opposed to perfect tax instruments for the 
levels of the fixed taxes are substantial. Whereas perfect variable tax 
instruments (and hence differentiation between fuel types) yielded fixed taxes 
that hardly differed according to fuel type, this is not the case if kilometre taxes 
are used. The inability to differentiate variable taxes between diesel and 
gasoline implies that, although both fixed taxes decline relative to the reference 
case, diesel taxes (606 euro) are approximately twice this on gasoline cars (299 
euro). In other words, the use of kilometre taxes instead of full blown road 
pricing has large implications for the level of optimal fixed taxes, an 
observation not previously made in the literature.     
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6.  Revenue-neutral marginal policy reforms 
 
  As illustrated by the exercises reported in the previous section, full adjustment to 
optimal taxes often result in large changes from current values of the policy instruments. 
Policy makers may therefore be reluctant to implement the recommendations of optimal tax 
studies. In this section, we therefore also use the numerical model to perform a series of 
budgetary neutral marginal tax reform exercises, starting from the reference equilibrium. We 
focus on very small marginal tax changes: in each case, it is assumed that one tax is increased 
just enough to raise 1 additional euro of tax revenue, and that this is compensated by a 
reduction in one other tax. This type of analysis has been often used in the literature (see, e.g., 
Ahmad and Stern (1984), Ballard and Medema (1993), and Mayeres (2000)). It is especially 
useful to identify which policy instrument yields the highest welfare gain when used to 
generate extra tax revenue, and which of the available instruments is the most appropriate 
‘recycling’ instrument.  
  In the remainder of this section, we review the tax reforms implemented (subsection 
6.1), discuss the numerical results (subsection 6.2) and summarise the policy implications of 
our findings (subsection 6.3). 
 
6.1. The policy packages considered 
 
  The policy packages consist of a combination of two of the following instruments
12: 
 
a.  Fuel tax: the variable tax on gasoline or diesel car use is varied by the same amount in 
the peak and the off-peak period. Since fuel efficiency is assumed not to differ 
between the peak and the off-peak period and the fuel taxes are currently the same in 
the two periods, this indeed corresponds to a change in the fuel tax. 
 
b.  Road pricing: the variable tax on gasoline and diesel cars is increased in the peak 
period. This means that, on top of the existing fuel taxes, car users pay a charge that is 
                                                 
12 Note that the reform exercise of this section bears quite some similarity to Mayeres (2000) and Mayeres and 
Proost (2001). Differences are that we use a different set of transport tax instruments, focusing on the trade-offs 
between fixed and variable taxation. On the other hand, our partial equilibrium approach implies that we restrict 
ourselves to transport tax instruments, whereas the studies referred to above also considered general tax 
instruments, such as the labour income tax and social security transfers.   34
equal for the two car types. If variable taxes are used to recycle tax revenues, the 
variable tax on off-peak transport is reduced.  
 
c.  Fixed taxes: the fixed annual tax on gasoline or diesel cars is altered. 
 
d.  Public transport subsidies: public transport subsidies are adjusted in the peak or the 
off-peak period.  
 
    As the reforms are budgetary neutral, we can measure the change in social welfare as 
the change in  
  . SW NU E = −  (37) 
with respect to the initial equilibrium. The change in the final term captures the change in 
expected air pollution and accident costs with respect to the reference situation. In the 
calculation of changes in U it is obviously taken into account that the time needed per car km 
is affected by the car traffic flow that follows from the policy change
13.  
               
 
6.2. Numerical results 
 
            The results are given in Table 9; it is divided in three parts. The upper part of the table 
presents the full marginal welfare impact of the policy reforms, while the middle and the 
bottom part isolate two components that contribute to this change: the marginal benefit of the 
change in congestion and of the change in air pollution and accidents. To see the 
interpretation, consider the case where road pricing is used to tackle external costs and that 
budgetary neutrality is guaranteed by a reduction in the fuel tax on gasoline. The figure 0.71 
in the first column on the second row in the upper part of the table then means that, if road 
pricing is used to generate 1 extra euro of revenue, and if simultaneously gasoline taxes are 
reduced to keep the initial budget fixed, this joint operation generates a net welfare gain of 
0.71 euro. The middle and bottom parts of the table further indicate that this policy package 
yields a marginal benefit of 0.59 due to the reduction in congestion, whereas an extra benefit 
of 0.05 euro is due to the reduction in pollution and accident costs.  
                                                 
13 In a previous version of the paper, we also calculated the welfare effects of marginal tax reforms on the 
assumption that externalities did not matter, so that revenue raising was the government’s only objective. It was 
found that reducing public transport subsidies and raising fixed car taxes were the most efficient revenue raising 
instruments. Variable car taxes were the most efficient recycling instruments. Results are available on request.   35
  With this interpretation in mind, a first observation that follows from Table 9 is that 
peak road pricing is the policy measure generating the highest marginal welfare gain for a 
given revenue recycling strategy. This can be seen by horizontal comparison of the figures in 
the upper part of the table. Road pricing leads to a positive welfare effect for all recycling 
instruments considered in Table 9. Since it introduces a price differentiation between the peak 
and the off-peak period it is the most efficient instrument to tackle congestion, which is the 
dominant externality in the model. We found (not shown in the table) that peak road pricing 
generated a marginal congestion benefit of 0.84 euro per euro of government revenue, before 
taking into account the way in which the revenue is used. As can be seen from the middle part 
of Table 9, some revenue recycling instruments even reinforce this reduction in congestion. 
This is the case for higher public transport subsidies (marginal congestion benefit equal to 
1.1) since they encourage the switch from car to public transport. A lower fixed tax on 
gasoline cars also generates additional congestion benefits, because it encourages a switch 
from diesel cars to gasoline cars with a lower corresponding conditional mileage. The other 
revenue recycling instruments reduce the beneficial effect of peak road pricing on congestion. 
  Peak road pricing also leads to less air pollution and accidents, though the net effect 
on these externalities will vary according to the revenue recycling strategy that is used. Given 
the high air pollution damage caused by diesel cars, reducing taxes on diesel cars will lead to 
a net increase in air pollution costs. Reducing the variable car taxes on off-peak transport will 
also lead to a net increase in air pollution costs, given the relative magnitude of off-peak car 
transport and its price elasticity.  
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Table 9:   The marginal welfare impacts of revenue-neutral transport policy  
    packages in the presence of congestion, air pollution and accidents  
  (euro per euro of government revenue) 
 
Transport instrument → 




























































































Marginal welfare impact 
Lower off-peak variable car tax  
Lower fuel tax gasoline 
Lower fuel tax diesel 
Lower fixed tax gasoline 
Lower fixed tax diesel 
Higher peak public tp. subsidies 





























Marginal benefit of the change in congestion 
Lower off-peak variable car tax  
Lower fuel tax gasoline 
Lower fuel tax diesel 
Lower fixed tax gasoline 
Lower fixed tax diesel 
Higher peak public tp. subsidies 





























Marginal benefit of the change in air pollution and accidents 
Lower off-peak variable car tax  
Lower fuel tax gasoline 
Lower fuel tax diesel 
Lower fixed tax gasoline 
Lower fixed tax diesel 
Higher peak public tp. subsidies 































  Interestingly, the second most efficient instrument (for a given revenue recycling 
strategy) is the fuel tax on diesel. In all cases except one it leads to a welfare gain. In view of 
our focus on the role of fixed taxes, note that financing the fuel tax increase by a reduction in 
the fixed tax on diesel cars (a standard argument in the popular press to move from fixed to 
variable taxation on cars) is indeed welfare improving. However, also note that reducing off 
peak variable taxes is a more efficient recycling instrument: the welfare impact amounts to 0.5 
in this case, versus 0.17 in the case of a lower fixed diesel tax. Policy combinations containing 
higher diesel fuel taxes also reduce the traffic flow, but in a blunt way: they do not make a 
distinction between peak and off-peak. Therefore, the marginal benefit of a reduction in 
congestion is lower than in the case of peak road pricing. The higher fuel tax on diesel mainly  37
performs well because it reduces the emission damages from diesel cars for all revenue 
recycling strategies considered in Table 9.   
  In some, but not all, cases, raising fixed car taxes also leads to a net welfare gain. 
Since diesel cars are more polluting than gasoline cars, higher fixed taxes on diesel cars 
perform better than an increase in the fixed taxes on gasoline cars. Even then, however, note 
that it is important to carefully consider recycling instruments. Higher taxes on diesel cars are 
welfare improving only if recycled through lower off peak variable car taxes or lower taxes on 
gasoline; recycling via lower taxes on diesel is welfare reducing. For almost all revenue 
recycling strategies, higher fixed taxes on diesel cars have a positive impact on congestion 
since they encourage a switch to gasoline cars with lower conditional transport demand. In 
contrast, a higher fixed tax on gasoline cars mostly leads to more congestion, unless it is 
accompanied by higher public transport subsidies. 
  Vertical comparison of the recycling instruments for an increase in a given policy 
instrument shows that it appears always best to reduce the variable taxes on off-peak car 
transport. A reduction in fuel taxes performs worse, partly because it increases the congestion 
level. Moreover, a reduction in the fuel tax on diesel is worse than for gasoline, because diesel 
cars lead to higher air pollution costs and demand for diesel car transport is more price 
responsive.  
  The marginal welfare gains with lower fixed car taxes are also smaller than with lower 
variable car taxes in the off-peak. This is the case because fixed taxes are relatively efficient 
tax instruments for raising revenue, so that less can be gained by reducing them. Moreover, a 
lower fixed tax on diesel cars also increases the level of the three transport externalities. The 
opposite is true for a lower fixed tax on gasoline cars, which explains why this instrument 
performs better as a recycling instrument than the fixed tax on diesel cars. 
  Finally, increasing public transport subsidies in some cases also is a recycling 
instrument with positive welfare effects. The reason is obviously that higher subsidies reduce 
transport externalities. This is especially true for public transport subsidies in the peak period 
since they have the largest impact on the congestion level. 
  
6.3. Policy implications 
  
  Of course, the exercises reported in this section are limited because they are restricted 
to changing only the existing tax instruments on car use and ownership. Still, the results in 
Table 9 lead to two interesting general conclusions.   38
(i)  Marginal shifts from gasoline to diesel taxation, both for variable and fixed 
taxes, are welfare improving. Both higher fixed and variable diesel taxes, 
financed by especially lower fixed taxes on gasoline cars, are policy packages 
with substantial welfare benefits. This confirms the results of Mayeres and 
Proost (2001). 
 
(ii)  Somewhat surprisingly, a switch from fixed to variable taxes has ambiguous 
effects. For diesel cars, it is welfare improving to marginally reduce the fixed 
tax and to compensate the resulting revenue loss by a higher fuel tax. For 
gasoline cars, however, the impact of such a shift on the externalities is such 





7.   Conclusions and extensions 
 
 
  In this paper we presented a simple discrete/continuous choice model to study optimal 
two-part tariffs in the presence of externalities. The theoretical analysis focused on the 
specific role of variable and fixed taxes on vehicles to correct for externalities; the model 
assumed owners and non owners of cars all had access to public transport options, and it 
looked at constraints on the variable tax instruments. An empirical application of a numerical 
and extended version of the model to the optimal taxation of cars in Belgium yielded the 
following results. First, the current differences in tax treatment between diesel and gasoline 
cars and their use do not appear to be justified on the basis of the externalities they generate 
nor on the basis of budgetary considerations. Efficient pricing requires substantial increases in 
the relative user tax on diesel cars as compared to gasoline cars; optimal fixed taxes are 
substantially below current levels and only marginally differ between car fuel types. 
Moreover, efficient pricing involves a substantial increase in variable car taxes in the peak 
period to correct for externalities. Public transport subsidies on operating costs would be 
replaced by variable taxes. Large differences in fixed car taxes do result if for political or 
technical reasons variable taxes cannot be optimally adjusted. The same is true if the 
government uses a system of kilometre taxes that does not allow fuel differentiation as the 
main variable tax instrument.    39
  In a series of marginal tax reform exercises, we found that marginal shifts from 
gasoline to diesel taxation, both for variable and fixed taxes, are welfare improving. Both 
higher fixed and variable diesel taxes, financed by especially lower fixed taxes on gasoline 
cars, are policy packages with substantial welfare benefits. However, a switch from fixed to 
variable taxes has ambiguous effects. For diesel cars, it is welfare improving to marginally 
reduce the fixed tax and to compensate the resulting revenue loss by a higher fuel tax. For 
gasoline cars, however, the impact of such a shift on the externalities is such that this 
recommendation does not yield beneficial welfare effects.  
  It is clear that the analysis of this paper can be improved and extended. For example, it 
does not yet consider the equity issues associated with the imposition of two-part tariffs. Since 
equity issues cannot be ignored in transport policy reforms, this issue will be taken up in a 
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Appendix 1: derivation of optimal tax rules 
 
The government’s problem is to optimally select both the three variable prices 
,, g db p pp  and the two fixed car taxes  , g d FF  so as to maximise  
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subject to the budget restriction 
 
{ } () () () ( )
gd g d o
gg c g g dd c d d bbg b d b o b Np c xF p c xF p c x x x G ππ π π π     −+ + −+ + − + + =      
 
  First consider the first-order condition with respect to  g p . Using similar procedures as 
in De Borger (2001, appendix 1) it can be written as 
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 is the marginal utility of 
income for owners of a gasoline car, and the  i θ  (i=g,d,b) reflect the full marginal external cost 
of an increase in demand for kilometres by a gasoline car, a diesel car or public transport, 
taking account of potential feedbacks of the externality on demand. Differentiating the 
definition of the externality  ( , , )
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is the full welfare effect of an increase in E (i.e., the direct utility impact plus all budgetary 
implications evaluated at the shadow cost of the budget constraint), and ρ  is the feedback 
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The feedback term measures the indirect impact of an increase in E on the level of the 
externality itself via the conditional demands and ownership probabilities. It will be negative 
whenever the externality reduces demand. Congestion and accident risks are typical 
externalities that generate such feedbacks. For example, an increase in traffic raises 
congestion. This in turn reduces the conditional demand for car use as well as the desirability 
of owning a car. The demand-reducing effect of the externality itself mitigates the increase in 
the externality after an initial increase in X. Pollution, on the other hand, may well be an 
example of an externality without feedback effects. The effect of the feedback is that it may 
substantially dampen the effect of price changes. Holding the externality E constant, an 
increase in the price of diesel in principle affects the demand for both diesel and gasoline, and 
therefore, it affects the externality level. But since the externality itself in turn affects 
demands the overall price impact is adjusted. 
  Analogously, the first-order condition for the fixed annual fee on gasoline cars can be 
written as   
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  The first order conditions with respect to the variable and fixed diesel taxes are 
derived in a completely similar fashion and have the same structure. Finally, the first-order 
condition with respect to the bus price can be written, using the same method, as 
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Slightly reformulating yields 






















and the hat refers to compensated demand effects.  
Analogous reasoning on the basis of the first-order conditions for  d p and  d F yields, 
after very similar derivations 





















  We can now use (A.4)-(A.5) in the three first-order conditions with respect to the 
variable taxes to eliminate  , g d p p . Substituting, expressing all demand effects in terms of 
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where the notation  ˆ π refers to compensated choice probabilities (see Rosen and Small 





g go g do d d
gb b c b b c
g g
Dx x A x x x B x
p p
π π ∂ ∂






g go g do d d
db b c b b c
dd
Dx x A x x x B x
p p
π π ∂ ∂






g go g do d d
bb b c b b c
bb
Dx x A x x x B x
p p
π π ∂ ∂




Finally, the α ’s in system (A.6)-(A.7)-(A.8) capture all income effects, both those 
related to the conditional demands and to the choice probabilities. However, to facilitate the 
derivation and interpretation of optimal tax rules, we assume in the main body of the paper 
that the marginal private utility of income is independent of choice of car type (i.e., 
gdo mmmm === ) and that income effects of conditional demands are zero. In that case one 
easily shows that   47
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  We solve the three-equation system (A.6)-(A.7)-(A.8) by Cramer’s rule. A series of 
straightforward but long manipulations to develop the determinant of the system leads to the 
solution for the fixed taxes and public transport prices as given in the main body of the paper: 
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The term Z is given by: 
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are Slutsky terms associated with the conditional utility maximisation problems for gasoline 
and diesel owners, respectively. The negativity of the Slutsky terms implies that Z>0. 
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